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ABSTRACT 
 
STOCK-MARKET REACTIONS TO MERGERS OF NON-FINANCIAL 
TURKISH FIRMS 
Hekimoğlu, Mert Hakan 
M.S., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ayşe Başak Tanyeri 
 
September 2010 
 
 This study investigates stock-market reactions to mergers of non-financial 
Turkish firms. I conduct an event study to detect abnormal stock returns of Turkish 
target firms around merger announcements. In an efficient market, movements in 
stock prices (returns) reflect investors’ assessments of new information about the firm 
and its operating environs. Assuming market efficiency, event studies model 
“normal” returns. Abnormal returns are the difference between realized returns and 
normal returns. The sample consists of 125 mergers from July 1991 to July 2009. 
This study reveals that Turkish targets earn on average a cumulative abnormal return 
of 8.56% in the three-day window around merger announcements when control rights 
in target firms change hands. This study contributes to the merger literature by 
providing evidence that markets react positively to merger announcements of Turkish 
target firms. However, reaction of Turkish markets generates smaller returns than the 
reaction of US and European markets. Stock market’s reaction to merger 
announcements may differ from country to country as well as announcement date 
specification is problematic for Turkish firms which may be the reason for smaller 
returns in Turkish markets. 
 
Keywords: Turkey, Mergers, Acquisitions, Event Study  
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ÖZET 
 
FİNANSAL OLMAYAN TÜRK ŞİRKETLERİN BİRLEŞMELERİNE HİSSE 
SENEDİ PİYASASININ TEPKİLERİ 
Hekimoğlu, Mert Hakan 
Yüksek Lisans, İşletme Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Ayşe Başak Tanyeri 
 
Eylül 2010 
 
 Bu tezde finansal olmayan Türk şirketlerin birleşme duyurularına hisse senedi 
piyasasının gösterdiği tepkiler incelenmiştir. Birleşme duyurusu etrafında hedef 
şirketin anormal hisse senedi getirilerini ölçmek için olay çalışması yöntemi 
kullanılmıştır. Etkin bir piyasada, hisse fiyatındaki değişimler yatırımcıların şirket 
hakkındaki yeni haberleri değerlendirmesini yansıtır. Olay çalışmaları, piyasa 
etkinliği varsayımı altında, normal hisse senedi getirilerini modeller. Anormal 
getiriler, gerçekleşen getirler ile normal getirilerin farkı olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu 
çalışmanın örnek grubu Temmuz 1991 ile Temmuz 2009 arasında duyurulan 125 
birleşmeden oluşmaktadır. Yönetim haklarının el değiştirdiği birleşmelerde Türk 
hedef şirketlerinin birleşme duyurusunun etrafındaki üç günlük olay penceresinde 
ortalama olarak %8.56 kümülatif anormal getiri elde ettiği bulunmuştur. Bu tez, Türk 
hedef şirketlerinin birleşme duyurularına piyasaların olumlu tepki verdiğini gösteren 
kanıtlar sunarak birleşme literatürüne katkıda bulunmuştur. Bununla birlikte, Türk 
piyasalarının tepkisi, ABD ve Avrupa piyasalarının tepkilerinde kıyasla daha düşük 
getiriler yaratmıştır. Hisse senedi piyasalarının tepkisi ülkeden ülkeye değişebileceği 
gibi Türk şirketlerin duyuru yaptığı tarihlerin belirlenmesindeki problemler Türk 
piyasasındaki düşük getirilerin bir nedeni olabilir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Birleşmeler, Devralmalar, Olay Çalışması  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This study investigates the stock-market reactions to mergers & acquisitions (M&As) 
of non-financial Turkish target firms between 1986 and 2009. Mergers cause 
extensive reallocation of resources in the economy and are one of the most important 
investment decisions that a firm can make. The aggregated deal value of mergers in 
US between 1980 and 2005 is about $921 billion (in 2005 $) (Bargeron et al., 2008). 
The aggregated deal value of this study’s sample deals is 62 billion Turkish Liras (in 
2009 TL) between 1991 and 2009. This study reveals that Turkish merger targets 
(targets are the firms being purchased) earn on average a risk-adjusted return of 
8.56% in the three-day event window around merger announcements when control 
rights in target firms change hands. 
This study employs event study method to measure the effect of mergers on target 
shareholder value. In an efficient market, movements in stock prices (returns) reflect 
investors’ assessments of new information about the firm and its operating environs 
(Fama, 1991). Assuming market efficiency, event studies model “normal” returns. 
Abnormal returns (AR) are the difference between realized returns and normal 
(expected) returns. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the summation of ARs over 
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the three-day event window around merger announcements. To investigate whether 
and if mergers affect target shareholder value, I test significance ARs and CARs in 
the days surrounding merger announcements. 
Previous event studies examining stock-market reactions in US and European 
markets provide evidence that mergers create value for target firm shareholders. US 
and European target firms earn average CARs of 16% (Andrade et al., 2001) and 
12.47% (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009), respectively, in the three-day event 
window around merger announcements. This study contributes to the literature by 
providing empirical evidence from Turkish mergers. Turkish targets earn an average 
CAR of 8.56% in the three-day event window. 
The sample consists of 125 mergers from July 1991 to July 2009. Acquirer firms 
purchase target firms’ control rights in 52 mergers. I refer to these mergers as control-
changing mergers. 83 out of 125 mergers are completed. A completed merger is a 
merger in which the counterparties sign the merger contract and successfully 
conclude merger negotiations. Otherwise, the merger is incomplete1
                                                          
1 Securities Data Company (SDC) denotes the final status of mergers as effective, withdrawn, pending, 
or unknown. I classify a merger as completed if its final status in SDC is effective. Otherwise, I 
classify the merger as incomplete. 
. All target firms 
are Turkish, publicly traded, and non-financial firms. I collect data on mergers using 
Securities Data Company (SDC), Factiva, MarketLine, and IMKB Birleşme, 
Devralma, Bölünme Duyuruları (henceforth Istanbul Stock Exchange M&A 
Announcements). I use Datastream to collect data on stock and market returns. 
 
3 
This study reveals that Turkish target firms earn significantly positive premiums in 
the three-day event window around merger announcements. For the entire sample, I 
examine significantly positive ARs on the days before and after announcement (day -
1 and day 1, respectively) in addition to the announcement day (day 0). Average CAR 
in the three-day event window is 4.88% which is significant at 1%. 
For Turkish targets, control-changing mergers lead to higher premiums than non-
control-changing mergers. In a control-changing merger, acquirer firm purchases not 
only target firm shares but also its control rights. ARs for control-changing mergers 
are significant and positive on days -1, 0, and 1. However, for non-control-changing 
mergers, The only significant AR is on day 0. Average CAR in the three-day event 
window is 8.56% for control-changing mergers and 2.25% for non-control-changing 
mergers. Both CARs are significant at 1%.  
I show that completed mergers result in higher premiums than incomplete mergers for 
Turkish targets. Average CAR in the three-day event window for completed mergers 
is 6.08% which is significant at 1%. The corresponding CAR for incomplete mergers 
is 2.5% but insignificant. Results indicate that stock markets anticipate which deals 
will be successful. The anticipation of success is reflected in the higher returns 
enjoyed by target shareholders. Value of target rights is embedded in the higher 
returns of completed mergers. 
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This study shows that cross-border mergers do not affect target three-day CARs. 
Prior literature finds mixed results relating to cross-border mergers. Bruner (2004) 
examines 17 studies comparing CARs to US targets in cross-border mergers to 
domestic mergers. These studies report either higher premium in cross-border 
mergers or no difference. In contrast to Bruner (2004), Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009) find that cross-border European mergers result in lower CAR.  
Intra-industry mergers do not have a significant impact on target three-day CARs. 
Analyzing merger characteristics such as intra-industry mergers over a small sample 
is problematic. However, the insignificant result in this study can be explained by the 
small sample size. For example, using 760 deals, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) 
provide evidence that average CAR increases if the acquirer firm belongs to a 
different industry which is an inter-industry merger.  
This study also finds out that transaction value of deals does not affect the three-day 
CARs in Turkish mergers. However, missing data restricts analyzing the impact of 
transaction value. For example, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) emphasize that 
mergers with large transaction values tend to lower CAR. In this study, transaction 
values of mergers are only available in 85 deals.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Previous studies focus on the motivation behind mergers (Gort, 1969; Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996; Andrade and Stafford, 2004), and how mergers affect shareholder 
value (Andrade et al., 2001; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2009). 
 
2.1 What Motivates Merger Activity? 
Mergers are tools for firms to restructure themselves against industry shocks (Gort, 
1969; Jarrell et al., 1988; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). These studies show that 
merger activity is concentrated on industries that are exposed to shocks. Firms with 
better performance aim to acquire firms suffering from shocks in such industries 
(Andrade and Stafford, 2004). 
Merger occurs due to the discrepancies between the acquirer firm’s and target firm’s 
valuations of the same asset under economic shocks (Gort, 1969). Merger becomes 
possible when non-owners of a firm place a higher value on the assets of that firm 
than its owners. Economic disturbances make past data less useful for determining a 
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firm’s asset value. Thus, investors’ valuations vary. This variance leads to merger 
events. 
 
2.2 How Merger Activity Affects Shareholders? 
Previous studies focus on the value that mergers generate (destroy) for different 
groups of shareholders such as targets and acquirers. Stock prices reflect new 
information immediately according to the market efficiency (Fama, 1991). When 
merger announcement information becomes publicly available, investors assess this 
new information. Change in stock prices around the announcement date can be 
regarded as merger effect. Hence, it is a useful way for evaluating the impact of 
mergers (Bruner, 2004). 
Stock-market reactions are analyzed in either short-term or long-term (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Bruner, 2004). The three-day period around the merger announcement 
is an example of event window used in a short-term analysis. The period starting 
from the announcement day to 365 days after the announcement is an example of 
event window used in a long-term analysis. 
Stock market has to be efficient in order to make inferences from stock price 
movements around merger announcement. Balaban and Kunter (1997) test the 
efficiency of Turkish stock market between January 1989 and July 1995. Their results 
show that Turkish stock market is not efficient. Ozdemir (2008) tests the efficiency of 
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Turkish stock market in the period January 1990 to June 2005. His study reveals that 
Turkish stock market is a weak form efficient market. Weak form efficiency implies 
that all past prices are reflected in today’s price. Ozdemir (2008) examines a more 
recent sample compared to Balaban and Kunter (1997). The difference between the 
findings of these two studies may imply that Turkish stock market becomes more 
efficient through time. 
Studies given in Table 1 summarize the stock-market reactions of target firms. All 
these studies use an event study as it is used in this study. These studies define 
abnormal return as the difference between realized return and expected return, and 
examine cumulative abnormal returns over a short-term event window. 
Target CARs differ from market to market. Studies covering US market (Dodd, 1980; 
Asquith, 1983; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade et al., 2001; Bargeron et al., 
2008; Kuipers et al., 2009) and European markets (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; 
Campa and Hernando, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009) report significantly 
positive CARs to target firms. CAR to US targets ranges from 7.1% to 27.47%. 
However, European targets earn less CAR compared to US targets which is about 
4.48% to 12.47%.  
Target CARs also differ among European markets. UK targets earn more CAR than 
their Continental European counterparts, 17.64% and 10.19% respectively (see 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). Laws of UK establish better investor protection  
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Table 1: Summary of previous studies 
This table summarizes findings of previous studies. CARs to target firms obtained in 
these studies are listed below. 
 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Event 
Window 
Country 
Coverage 
Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Dodd (1980) 12.44% * [-1, +1] US 71 1970-1977 
Asquith (1983) 7.1% * [-1, +1] US 211 1962-1976 
Mulherin and 
Boone (2000) 
21.2% * [-1, +1] US 376 1990-1999 
Andrade et al. 
(2001) 
16% * [-1, +1] US 3,688 1973-1998 
Bargeron et al. 
(2008) 
27.47% * [-1, +1] US 1,667 1980-2005 
Kuipers et al. 
(2009) 
23.07% * [-1, 0] US 181 1982-1991 
Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) 
9.01% * [-1, 0] Europe 136 1993-2000 
Campa and 
Hernando (2004) 
4.48% * [-1, +1] Europe 188 1998-2000 
Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009) 
12.47% * [-1, +1] Europe 760 1993-2001 
Gopalaswamy et al. 
(2008) 
-0.29% [-1, +1] India 25 2000-2007 
Wong and Cheung 
(2009) 
-0.24% [-1, 0] Asia 203 2000-2007 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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than laws of countries in Continental Europe. The difference in CARs may arise from 
difference in legal systems (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2009). 
Indian and Asian mergers neither generate nor destroy value to target firms. 
Gopalaswamy et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence from India. They examine 25 
mergers in the period between 2000 and 2007. CAR in the three-day event window is 
not statistically different than zero. Wong and Cheung (2009) investigate stock-
market reaction to mergers of Asian firms. Their sample consists of mergers from 
Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea between 2000 and 
2007. They report that CAR in the two-day event window [-1, 0] is not statistically 
different than zero. 
Differences in target CARs among different markets are discussed up to here. Impact 
of merger characteristics on target CARs is also examined in the literature. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find that partial majority acquisitions (less than 
100% of equity) generate lower target CARs than mergers or 100% acquisitions. 
Targets earn 15.61% CAR in mergers or 100% acquisitions. However, average CAR 
is 3.46% for partial majority acquisitions. After mergers or 100% acquisitions, 
acquirer firm becomes the single controller of the target firm. In partial majority 
acquisitions, a minority stake remains at the target shareholders. Minority 
shareholders are worried about losing their remaining shares. Hence, value created by 
the merger decreases (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). 
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Completed mergers generate higher CAR than incomplete mergers (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). Completed mergers generate 10.3% CAR while incomplete ones 
generate 5.51% CAR in two-day event window [-1, 0]. Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) prove that investors anticipate which deals will be successful. Hence, they put 
a higher valuation on successful deals. 
Both cross-border mergers and domestic mergers generate shareholder value. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) provide that average CAR is 12.55% in domestic 
mergers and 11.52% in cross-border mergers. They imply that difficulties in 
integration between cross-border firms cause this small but significant difference. 
Bruner (2004) examines 17 studies comparing cross-border mergers to domestic 
mergers in US. These studies report either higher CARs in cross-border mergers or no 
difference in contrast to Martynova and Renneboog (2009). Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) also compare domestic mergers to cross-border mergers in Europe. They do 
not find a significant difference in CARs. 
Industry relatedness of target and acquirer firms is another characteristic that affects 
CARs to targets. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) provide evidence that CARs 
increase if the acquirer firm belongs to a different industry than the target firm. 
Acquirers make bids in a more aggressive manner to diversify their business to 
different industries (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). 
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Payment method has a significant impact on CARs to targets. Stock-financed mergers 
create lower CAR than cash-financed mergers (Andrade et al., 2001). In the three-day 
event window, they report 13% average CAR in stock-financed mergers and 20.1% in 
cash-financed mergers. Andrade et al. (2001) cover US mergers. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) provide evidence from European mergers that support Andrade et 
al. (2001). Cash-financed mergers create 3.24% more target CARs than stock-
financed mergers (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
Acquirer firm’s status affects CARs to target firms. Target firms earn higher CARs 
when the acquirer firm is public (Bargeron et al., 2008). They examine 1,667 mergers 
in US. Acquirers are public in 1,214 deals and private in 453 deals. Targets earn 
27.47% average CAR in the three-day event window for all acquirers. However, 
average CAR becomes 29.48% for public acquirers and 22.06% for the private ones. 
They explain this difference by managerial ownership. Managerial ownership in a 
private firm is stronger than the ownership in a public firm. An acquirer firm with 
lower managerial ownership tends to pay higher for a target firm. Thus, targets earn 
more from public acquirers (Bargeron et al., 2008). 
Government control and strict regulations in an industry lower CARs to target firms 
(Campa and Hernando, 2004). Heavily government control in regulated industries 
reduces the completion possibility of a merger. Hence, investors put a lower valuation 
on the merger which reduces the CAR to the target firms.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study investigates whether mergers create or destroy value to target shareholders 
by conducting an event study. In an efficient market, all public information is 
reflected in the stock price. Hence, assuming no information leakages, stock market 
reacts to a new event at its public announcement. Movements in stock prices reflect 
investors’ assessment of new information. Assuming market efficiency, event studies 
model expected returns. As in Brown and Warner (1985) and MacKinlay (1997), I 
use abnormal stock return to measure the impact of mergers on target shareholders. 
Abnormal return is the difference between realized return and expected return of a 
stock on a given day. Realized return is the observed stock return. 
 
3.1 Modeling Expected Returns 
Expected return is modeled using OLS market as it is done by Brown and Warner 
(1985). OLS market model relates the return of a stock to the return of a market index 
in a linear combination (MacKinlay, 1997). This statistical model computes the 
expected return of a stock according to its sensitivity to the market return. OLS 
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market model illustrates the linear relation between stock return and market return as 
in Equation 1. 
titmiiti RR ,,, εβα ++=       (1) 
( ) 0, =tiE ε   ( ) 2, itiVar εσε =  
where tiR ,  is the return of stock i at time t, tmR ,  is the market return at time t. 
Abnormal return of stock i at time t is ti,ε  which is the residual term. Abnormal 
return, ti ,ε , has a zero mean and a constant variance, and is assumed to be normally 
distributed. Abnormal returns of an individual stock are not normally distributed 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). However, cross-sectional average of abnormal returns 
shows normal distribution properties as sample size increases according to the 
Central Limit Theorem (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
 
3.2 Calculating Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
I difference realized (observed) returns from my estimates of expected returns to 
arrive at abnormal returns. Equation 2 calculates daily abnormal returns. 
( )tmiititi RRA ,,, ˆˆ βα +−=       (2) 
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where tiR ,  is the realized return of stock i at time t, and ( )tmii R ,ˆˆ βα +  is the expected 
return of stock i at time t. Then, I compute cross-sectional average of daily abnormal 
returns as shown in Equation 3 for all targets in the sample. 
∑
=
=
tN
i
ti
t
t AN
A
1
,
1
          (3) 
where tA  is the average daily abnormal return at time t, and tN  is the number of 
mergers in the sample. 
Cumulative abnormal return over a multi-day interval is a commonly used gauge for 
measuring stock-market reactions to mergers. I calculate the three-day cumulative 
abnormal return (from the day before the announcement to the day after the 
announcement) using Equation 4. 
[ ] ∑
+
−=
+− =
1
1
1,1
t
tACAR          (4) 
Besides the three-day event window, I also investigate seven-day and 11-day event 
windows for checking robustness. I compute average cumulative abnormal returns for 
these event windows using the same procedure. 
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3.3 Computing Test Statistics 
To investigate the effects of mergers on target shareholder value, I test for the 
significance of abnormal returns around announcements. If mergers generate value 
for target shareholders, abnormal returns are significantly greater than zero. If, on the 
other hand, mergers destroy value, abnormal returns are significantly less than zero. If 
mergers neither generate nor destroy value, abnormal returns are not significantly 
different than zero. 
I test the null hypothesis that there is no abnormal return on day t. The test statistic is 
the ratio of average abnormal return on that day to its estimated standard deviation. 
This test statistic is distributed Student-t; however, it shows unit normal distribution 
properties since the degree of freedom is greater than 200 (Brown and Warner, 1985).  
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where 0T  is the starting day of estimation window, and 1T  is the starting day of event 
window2
I apply the same procedure to multi-day intervals for testing the significance of 
average cumulative abnormal returns with modifications. Since I test the significance 
of returns over a multi-day period, the new null hypothesis becomes there is no 
cumulative abnormal return in the specified multi-day interval. Also, the test statistic 
takes the form below for three-day event window around the merger announcement. I 
assume that this test statistic is unit normal. 
.    
[ ] ( ) ( )1,0~ˆ
2
1
1
1
2
1,1 NASCAR
t
t 




∑
+
−=
+−                  (8) 
The numerator becomes the average cumulative abnormal return in the three-day 
event window. I modify the denominator to account for the standard deviation of a 
three-day interval instead of a single day. 
 
3.4 Estimating α and β Coefficients 
I estimate iαˆ  and iβˆ  coefficients for each stock i using OLS regression. I define two 
time windows before running OLS regressions to compute iαˆ  and iβˆ  coefficients. 
These windows are estimation window and event window. Former is the window for 
                                                          
2 I define estimation window and event window in Section 3.4. 
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estimation of expected returns ( iαˆ  and iβˆ  estimates), and the latter is the window for 
calculating abnormal returns.  
I define the event window as starting 30 days prior to the merger announcement and 
ending 30 days after the announcement. The estimation window covers the 252-day 
days before the event window. Figure 1 illustrates the merger timeline. 
 
Figure 1: Merger timeline 
The estimation and event windows do not overlap, so as to eliminate the effect of 
mergers from the estimation of the expected returns. Assuming an efficient market, 
returns in the short event-window around the merger announcement should reflect the 
investors’ assessment of the effect of merger on shareholder value. The estimation 
window is 252 days which is similar to what Brown and Warner (1985) and 
MacKinlay (1997) use. 
After defining the estimation window, next step is computing iαˆ  and iβˆ  coefficients. 
I run OLS regression using Equation 1 in the estimation window ( 1,..., 10 −= TTt ) for 
each stock. A firm can make several merger announcements in different times. 
Market beta of that firm may change through time. So, if a firm makes more than one 
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merger announcement, I will estimate OLS coefficients of that firm’s stock for each 
merger. 
2820 −=T , 301 −=T , and 302 +=T  as illustrated in Figure 1. Given these time 
indices, Equation 1 estimates iαˆ  and iβˆ  coefficients for each merger. Equation 2 
computes daily abnormal returns from day -282 to day +30 for each merger. Equation 
3 calculates the average abnormal returns from day -282 to day +30. Equation 4 
computes the average three-day cumulative abnormal return. Finally, Equation 5 and 
Equation 8 construct the test statistics for average ARs and  average three-day CAR, 
respectively.  
 
3.5 Definition of Confounding Mergers and Elimination Procedure 
If a target firm makes a previous merger announcement in 312 days before the current 
announcement, I call current merger confounding. I remove confounding mergers, 
because confounding mergers would distort abnormal returns. My study relies on the 
assumption that stock market reacts to event announcements in the short window 
surrounding the announcements. Hence, estimation window and event window of a 
merger should not overlap other merger announcements. Otherwise, another merger 
announcement, that takes place in estimation window, would distort OLS coefficients 
and this would distort ARs and CARs. 
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Figure 2 describes the timeline for filtering out confounding events. Any merger 
announcement that follows a merger announcement of the same firm by less than 312 
days drops out of the sample. 
 
Figure 2: Non-confounding merger timeline  
In Figure 2, X represents the announcement of interest. Post-event window of the 
previous announcement and estimation window of X should not overlap. To satisfy 
this, at least 312 days should pass between the current announcement and the 
previous announcement. Restrictions on the difference between the current 
announcement and the next announcement exist. For example, a target firm may 
make multiple merger announcements in short time period with the same acquirer. In 
such a case, the stock market reaction is assumed to be concentrate around the first 
announcement, because investors assess the initial announcement more unexpected 
than the subsequent announcements (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Therefore, I hold the 
initial announcement in the sample and remove all subsequent announcements. I refer 
to this type of mergers as multiple stage mergers.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DATA 
 
I need to collect the sample of mergers, the merger announcement dates, daily returns 
of target shares and daily returns of a market index in order to apply the method 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
First, I compile the sample of mergers. I collect merger using Securities Data 
Company (SDC) International M&A Database. I refer to Factiva, MarketLine, and 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) M&A Announcements for increasing sample size. 
Second, I cross-check the announcement dates using ISE Company News. Third, I 
collect merger terms using SDC. I use the earlier date if a conflict occurs among the 
sources. Fourth, I obtain daily stock returns and daily market returns (ISE-100 returns 
in this study) from Datastream. 
 
4.1 Merger Sample 
The sample of merger deals come from SDC International M&A Database. All 
targets are Turkish, publicly traded and non-financial firms. Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(ISE) was established in 1986; so, I start searching for deals from 1986. Last access 
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to SDC International M&A Database was in April 2006. Table 2 shows the results of 
the filters. Applying the procedure for eliminating confounding mergers reduces the 
sample from 142 to 95 deals. 
Table 2: Filters applied to SDC International M&A Database 
This table shows the filters I apply to SDC International M&A Database. I find 142 
mergers after filtering out the database. 
Target Firm  
Turkish 1,544 hits 
Publicly Traded 285 hits 
Non-Financial 198 hits 
Announcement Date  
01/01/1986 - 30/04/2006 142 hits 
 
I augment the merger sample by perusing merger announcements in newspapers 
using Factiva. I search for Turkish mergers from 1986 to 2009. The search criteria are 
in Appendix A. I include mergers in which target firms are Turkish, publicly traded, 
and non-financial. The Factiva deals for the period 1986-2006 overlap with SDC 
International M&A Database. I append 17 non-confounding mergers to the sample 
using Factiva deals after 2006. 
The MarketLine Database is another source to augment the merger sample. 
MarketLine Database keeps track of mergers. I examine both completed and 
incomplete mergers announced. I add 10 non-confounding mergers using 
MarketLine. 
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ISE M&A Announcements is the final data source for enlarging the sample. ISE 
discloses information about mergers in which at least one party is publicly traded in 
ISE. I add three mergers from these disclosures since ISE announcements started in 
2007.  
 
4.2 Checking the Validity of Announcement Dates 
I check the validity of announcement dates using ISE Company News for each firm 
listed in the sample. I examine news starting from two years before the announcement 
date. If I find an earlier announcement using ISE Company News than the 
announcement given by the other sources, I use earlier date as the announcement 
date. In addition to updating the announcement dates, I use ISE Company News to fill 
any missing merger terms that may exist in the merger data from SDC. 
 
4.3 Collecting Daily Returns 
This study analyzes the daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns in 
the three-day event window. I obtain daily adjusted stock prices ( tiP , ) and ISE-100 
index from Datastream. Datastream defines adjusted price as the official closing price 
which is adjusted for capital actions. Daily stock return is the daily percentage change 
in adjusted stock price. I compute daily stock returns ( tiR , ) as in Equation 9. 
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ISE-100 index is the market benchmark. Daily percentage change in ISE-100 index is 
the daily market return. I collect stock and market returns from 01/06/1990 to 
10/09/2009 on a daily basis. 
 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics on the Sample and Merger Characteristics 
The final sample consists of 125 merger announcements between July 1991 and July 
2009. Five of them are multiple stage mergers. All target firms are publicly traded, 
non-financial, and Turkish. 83 merger announcements are completed. Control rights 
of target firm change hands in 52 mergers. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics 
about the merger characteristics. 
The difference between average and median transaction values is due to the presence 
of large mergers. There are 13 mergers with transaction values greater than 1 billion 
TL. I classify firms according to Two-Digit SIC Codes. If Two-Digit SIC Code of 
target and acquirer is the same, I refer to this merger as intra-industry merger. 39% of 
the deals are intra-industry mergers. 44.8% of mergers are domestic while 41.6% of 
mergers are cross-border. Acquirer’s nationality is unknown for the remaining 13.6%. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics about the merger characteristics 
Panels A and B shows the number of: (i) completed and incomplete mergers; (ii) 
control-changing and non-control-changing mergers. Panel C provides average, 
median and total transaction values in nominal and real terms. Panels D to G 
partitions the sample by: (i) intra-industry mergers; (ii) acquirer nation; (iii) attitude 
of acquirer; (iv) status of acquirer. Panel H shows average and median of shares 
acquired. 
PANEL A – Merger Status  
Completed 83 
Incomplete 42 
PANEL B – Control Change  
Control-Changing 52 
Non-Control Changing 73 
PANEL C – Transaction Value n = 85 (where applicable) 
 Nominal (Million TL) Real (2009 Million TL) 
Average 353 729 
Median 51 150 
Total 30,020 61,955 
PANEL D – Intra-Industry 39% 
PANEL E – Acquirer Nation   
Domestic 44.8% 
Cross-Border 41.6% 
Unknown 13.6% 
PANEL F – Attitude   
Friendly 48.0% 
Neutral 18.4% 
Not Applicable 33.6% 
PANEL G – Acquirer Status   
Private 39.2% 
Public 24.8% 
Subsidiary 11.2% 
Joint Venture 2.4% 
Investor 0.8% 
Unknown 21.6% 
PANEL H – Share Distribution n = 111 (where applicable) 
Average % of shares acquired 40% 
Median % of shares acquired 40% 
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Table 4 shows the yearly distribution of mergers. Even though the sample starts from 
1986, I observe the first merger in 1991. 1995 and 1998 are years with large number 
of mergers. Merger activity peaked in 2001 and 2007. However, this sample does not 
completely map the merger history of Turkey, since I only deal with mergers in 
which target firm is publicly traded and non-financial. 
Table 4: Sample composition by years 
This table gives the number of deals per year.  Average and total transaction values 
per year are provided for mergers in which transaction values are available. All 
transaction values are given in December 2009 TL. 
 # of Mergers 
Avg. Transaction 
Value 
Total Transaction 
Value 
1991 1 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 
1993 7 1,205,623,118 3,616,869,353 
1994 2 69,214,009 69,214,009 
1995 12 249,722,926 1,748,060,479 
1996 5 239,840,695 239,840,695 
1997 4 1,744,725,399 5,234,176,196 
1998 12 222,705,368 2,449,759,047 
1999 2 212,570,564 212,570,564 
2000 10 1,213,113,188 8,491,792,318 
2001 15 97,535,566 877,820,095 
2002 8 316,417,432 949,252,297 
2003 8 914,092,738 4,570,463,689 
2004 0 0 0 
2005 10 2,205,821,147 22,058,211,475 
2006 4 275,632,662 1,102,530,647 
2007 15 688,253,332 8,259,039,981 
2008 8 292,446,775 2,047,127,424 
2009 2 28,015,321 28,015,321 
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I also examine yearly distribution of merger activity in terms of transaction value 
whenever data is available. Transaction values are available for 85 of 125 mergers. I 
collect Consumer Price Index to adjust the nominal transaction values based on 
December 2009. Table 4 also provides real transaction values per year. Both total and 
average real transaction values make a peak in 2005 due to large mergers like 
Turkcell, TUPRAS, and Eregli Demir Celik. 
I classify mergers as domestic or cross-border. Table 5 tabulates acquirers according 
to the nation. Acquirers in 56 deals are Turkish firms. Germany and United Kingdom 
are the next two nations with highest number of deals. There are 17 mergers in which 
acquirer firm’s nation is unknown. Unknown nations are related to seeking buyer 
announcements made by target firms. According to SDC, seeking buyer 
announcements are announcements in which target firm reveals plans to seek out a 
buyer for its assets.  
Table 6 tabulates deals according to acquirer and target industries. Mergers cluster in 
two industries which are “Food and kindred products” and “Stone, clay, and glass 
products”. These two industries may be exposed to deregulation or industry shocks. 
This observation fits in to the literature since the literature proves merger activity 
clusters in industries.  
Appendix B lists target and acquirer names, control-change status, merger status, 
announcement date, and transaction value of all mergers in the sample. 
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Table 5: Sample composition by countries of acquirer firms 
This table gives the number of deals by acquirer firm’s country. 
Acquirer’s Nation # of Mergers 
Turkey 56 
Germany 10 
United Kingdom 9 
Belgium 4 
Netherlands 4 
United States 3 
Italy 2 
France 2 
Austria 2 
Denmark 2 
Switzerland 2 
Egypt 1 
Greece 1 
Brazil 1 
Czech Republic 1 
Finland 1 
Israel 1 
Kazakhstan 1 
Luxembourg 1 
Poland 1 
Singapore 1 
Spain 1 
Sweden 1 
Cross-Border 52 
Unknown 17 
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Table 6: Sample composition by industries of target and acquirer firms 
This table gives the number of deals by industries of target and acquirer firms. 
Classification is made by two-digit SIC codes. 
Two-Digit SIC Code and Name Target Acquirer 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 2 2 
14 Nonmetallic Minerals, except Fuels 2 1 
20 Food and Kindred Products 16 14 
22 Textile Mill Products 3 3 
26 Paper and Allied Products 6 1 
27 Printing and Publishing 7 2 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 9 5 
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 13 1 
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 2 3 
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 15 7 
33 Primary Metal Industries 6 2 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 2 1 
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 4 1 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 5 4 
37 Transportation Equipment 5 8 
45 Transportation by Air 5 1 
48 Communications 4 1 
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 3 2 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 1 - 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 3 5 
53 General Merchandise Stores 2 - 
54 Food Stores 5 3 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 1 - 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 1 - 
60 Depository Institutions - 4 
61 Nondepository Institutions - 1 
62 Security and Commodity Brokers - 5 
63 Insurance Carriers - 2 
67 Holding & Other Investment Offices - 43 
70 Hotels and Other Lodging Places 1 - 
73 Business Services - 1 
75 Auto Repair, Services, and Parking - 1 
78 Motion Pictures 1  87 Engineering & Management Services 1 - 
- Unknown - 1 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical results on whether mergers generate or destroy 
value to Turkish target shareholders. First, I analyze daily abnormal returns. 
Cumulative abnormal return analysis follows daily abnormal returns. I conduct the 
analysis in the full sample and in subsamples according to control-change status and 
final status of deals. Finally, I analyze impact of merger characteristics, such as cross-
border merger, intra-industry merger, and transaction value, on CAR in the three-day 
event window. 
 
5.1 Average Daily Abnormal Returns 
Equation 3 computes average daily abnormal returns. I test their statistical 
significance using Equation 5. I examine average ARs in the event window which is 
the 61-day window around merger announcement.  
 
5.1.1 Average ARs in Full Sample 
I notice significant average ARs on the day before announcement, the announcement 
day, and the day after announcement. In line with the finding of significant ARs in 
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the three-day window, the ARs are 1.22%, 2.04%, and 1.62% with t-statistics of 3.33, 
5.55, and 4.40, respectively. Target firms earn significant and positive AR. No 
significant AR is detected in the rest of the event window. Average adjusted R2
iαˆ
 for all 
the 125 OLS regressions that estimate  and iβˆ   is 31%. Table 7 provides average 
ARs and the related t-statistics. 
Table 7: Average ARs in all mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Full Sample 
125 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat  Day AR (%) t-stat -30 0.70 1.91  1 1.62 4.40 * -29 -0.18 -0.49  2 0.81 2.22 -28 0.31 0.85  3 -0.43 -1.18 -27 -0.10 -0.28  4 -0.87 -2.37 -26 -0.28 -0.77  5 -0.41 -1.11 -25 -0.74 -2.01  6 -0.29 -0.78 -24 -0.21 -0.56  7 -0.01 -0.03 -23 0.11 0.29  8 -0.04 -0.12 -22 0.23 0.62  9 -0.23 -0.63 -21 0.20 0.54  10 0.55 1.50 -20 -0.44 -1.19  11 -0.15 -0.41 -19 -0.50 -1.37  12 -0.45 -1.23 -18 0.39 1.05  13 -0.55 -1.49 -17 0.20 0.55  14 -0.27 -0.73 -16 0.09 0.25  15 0.65 1.77 -15 0.31 0.84  16 -0.13 -0.35 -14 0.09 0.24  17 0.43 1.17 -13 0.30 0.81  18 -0.70 -1.90 -12 0.13 0.34  19 -0.20 -0.56 -11 0.36 0.99  20 -0.44 -1.20 -10 -0.35 -0.96  21 -0.29 -0.78 -9 0.01 0.01  22 0.01 0.04 -8 -0.69 -1.87  23 -0.23 -0.64 -7 -0.25 -0.67  24 -0.33 -0.90 -6 0.21 0.57  25 0.06 0.17 -5 0.67 1.81  26 0.02 0.05 -4 0.30 0.82  27 -0.63 -1.72 -3 0.27 0.72  28 -0.70 -1.91 -2 0.42 1.15  29 0.61 1.65 -1 1.22 3.33 *  30 -0.08 -0.22 0 2.04 5.55 *     
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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5.1.2 Average ARs in Control-Changing versus Non-Control-Changing Mergers 
I compare ARs in control-changing mergers to ARs in non-control-changing mergers. 
There are 52 control-changing mergers. Average ARs to target firms are significant 
and positive on days -1, 0, and 1 for control-changing mergers. Average ARs are 
2.87%, 2.87%, and 2.82%, respectively. Table 8 provides average ARs in the 61-day 
event window in control-changing mergers. I also examine significant ARs on days 4 
and 29. Negative AR on day 4 may indicate a reaction to the run-up in stock prices 
around the announcement date. Positive AR on day 29 loses its significance when I 
crop 0.5% of the daily returns in the lower and upper tails. There are 73 non-control-
changing mergers in the sample. I notice significant AR only on the announcement 
day. Target firms realize a small but significant average AR of 1.44% on day 0. I do 
not find any significant AR on the remaining 60 days in event window. Table 9 
shows ARs and the related t-statistics in non-control-changing mergers. 
Significant ARs detected in the full sample arises from control-changing mergers. I 
find a stronger stock-market reaction in control-changing mergers than the reaction in 
non-control-changing mergers. This is an expected result in accordance with the 
literature. Minority share acquisitions do not create as strong an impact as majority 
share acquisitions (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). 
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Table 8: Average ARs in control-changing mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Control-Changing 
52 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat   Day AR (%) t-stat 
-30 0.23 0.46   1 2.82 5.56 * 
-29 -0.39 -0.77   2 0.26 0.52 
-28 0.93 1.82   3 -0.18 -0.36 
-27 -0.40 -0.80   4 -1.46 -2.87 * 
-26 0.24 0.47   5 0.33 0.64 
-25 -0.79 -1.55   6 -0.37 -0.73 
-24 0.54 1.06   7 0.04 0.09 
-23 0.51 1.01   8 -0.33 -0.64 
-22 0.36 0.71   9 -0.07 -0.14 
-21 0.33 0.64   10 0.42 0.82 
-20 -0.62 -1.21   11 0.34 0.67 
-19 -1.05 -2.07   12 -0.32 -0.62 
-18 0.61 1.20   13 -0.67 -1.31 
-17 -0.57 -1.13   14 -0.47 -0.93 
-16 -0.11 -0.22   15 0.17 0.34 
-15 0.88 1.73   16 0.03 0.07 
-14 0.50 0.99   17 0.21 0.41 
-13 0.17 0.34   18 -0.42 -0.83 
-12 0.40 0.80   19 -0.06 -0.12 
-11 0.65 1.29   20 -0.40 -0.79 
-10 -0.31 -0.61   21 -0.63 -1.24 
-9 -0.32 -0.62   22 0.01 0.02 
-8 -0.24 -0.47   23 0.21 0.41 
-7 0.16 0.32   24 -0.03 -0.06 
-6 0.73 1.44   25 0.01 0.02 
-5 0.73 1.44   26 -0.35 -0.69 
-4 0.05 0.10   27 -0.63 -1.23 
-3 0.48 0.95   28 -0.48 -0.95 
-2 1.04 2.05   29 1.36 2.67 * 
-1 2.87 5.65 *   30 -0.31 -0.62 
0 2.87 5.66 *         
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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Table 9: Average ARs in non-control-changing mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Non-Control-Changing 
73 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat   Day AR (%) t-stat 
-30 1.03 2.16   1 0.76 1.58 
-29 -0.03 -0.06   2 1.21 2.52 
-28 -0.12 -0.26   3 -0.62 -1.29 
-27 0.11 0.23   4 -0.45 -0.94 
-26 -0.65 -1.36   5 -0.93 -1.94 
-25 -0.70 -1.46   6 -0.23 -0.47 
-24 -0.74 -1.54   7 -0.05 -0.10 
-23 -0.18 -0.38   8 0.16 0.34 
-22 0.13 0.27   9 -0.35 -0.73 
-21 0.11 0.22   10 0.65 1.35 
-20 -0.31 -0.64   11 -0.51 -1.06 
-19 -0.11 -0.24   12 -0.55 -1.15 
-18 0.23 0.47   13 -0.46 -0.97 
-17 0.76 1.58   14 -0.12 -0.25 
-16 0.24 0.50   15 1.00 2.08 
-15 -0.09 -0.20   16 -0.25 -0.52 
-14 -0.21 -0.44   17 0.59 1.23 
-13 0.39 0.81   18 -0.90 -1.88 
-12 -0.07 -0.15   19 -0.31 -0.64 
-11 0.16 0.33   20 -0.47 -0.98 
-10 -0.38 -0.80   21 -0.04 -0.08 
-9 0.23 0.49   22 0.02 0.04 
-8 -1.00 -2.09   23 -0.56 -1.16 
-7 -0.54 -1.12   24 -0.55 -1.14 
-6 -0.17 -0.35   25 0.10 0.20 
-5 0.62 1.29   26 0.29 0.60 
-4 0.48 1.00   27 -0.64 -1.33 
-3 0.11 0.23   28 -0.86 -1.80 
-2 -0.02 -0.04   29 0.07 0.14 
-1 0.05 0.10   30 0.09 0.18 
0 1.44 3.01 *         
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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5.1.3 Average ARs in Completed versus Incomplete Mergers 
Table 10 and Table 11 provide ARs in completed and incomplete mergers, 
respectively. There are significant ARs on days -1, 0, and 1 in completed mergers. 
Average ARs are 1.77%, 2.52%, and 1.79% with t-statistics of 4.10, 5.81, and 4.13. 
Target firms are the winners in completed mergers as they are so in control-changing 
mergers. There is not significant AR in incomplete mergers. 
Investors do not know whether a merger will successfully complete or fail at the 
announcement date. However, the difference in market reactions to completed 
mergers and incomplete mergers show that investors may anticipate the successful 
conclusion of mergers. Therefore, investors put a higher valuation on mergers which 
will be completed. 
 
5.1.4 Average ARs in Control-Changing and Completed Mergers 
Merger literature focuses on studies examining both control-changing and completed 
mergers. 42 of 125 mergers are both control-changing and completed in this study. I 
find significant ARs of 3.31%, 3.09%, and 2.53% on days -1, 0, and 1, respectively. 
These ARs are slightly greater than ARs in control-changing mergers, because there 
is no incomplete merger in this subsample. Table 12 presents the associated ARs and 
t-statistics3
                                                          
3 Appendix C provides the ARs and t-statistics in the remaining three subsamples. 
. 
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Table 10: Average ARs in completed mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Completed 
83 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat   Day AR (%) t-stat 
-30 0.35 0.80   1 1.79 4.13 * 
-29 -0.01 -0.02   2 0.88 2.04 
-28 0.11 0.25   3 -0.34 -0.79 
-27 -0.02 -0.06   4 -0.99 -2.29 
-26 -0.43 -1.00   5 -0.26 -0.61 
-25 -0.86 -1.99   6 -0.87 -2.00 
-24 0.00 0.00   7 -0.25 -0.58 
-23 0.06 0.15   8 0.19 0.45 
-22 0.15 0.34   9 -0.25 -0.58 
-21 -0.11 -0.26   10 0.71 1.65 
-20 -0.14 -0.31   11 -0.01 -0.03 
-19 -0.56 -1.29   12 -0.58 -1.33 
-18 0.51 1.17   13 -0.77 -1.79 
-17 0.24 0.57   14 -0.27 -0.61 
-16 0.64 1.47   15 0.53 1.23 
-15 0.25 0.58   16 -0.19 -0.44 
-14 0.33 0.76   17 0.57 1.33 
-13 0.26 0.60   18 -0.66 -1.53 
-12 0.64 1.49   19 -0.17 -0.39 
-11 0.03 0.08   20 -0.62 -1.44 
-10 -0.53 -1.22   21 -0.87 -2.02 
-9 -0.06 -0.13   22 -0.06 -0.14 
-8 -0.75 -1.74   23 -0.22 -0.50 
-7 -0.07 -0.17   24 -0.56 -1.30 
-6 0.52 1.21   25 0.03 0.07 
-5 0.91 2.11   26 -0.16 -0.38 
-4 0.68 1.57   27 -0.95 -2.19 
-3 0.19 0.44   28 -0.39 -0.91 
-2 0.84 1.94   29 1.08 2.50 
-1 1.77 4.10 *   30 -0.12 -0.27 
0 2.52 5.81 *         
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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Table 11: Average ARs in incomplete mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Incomplete 
42 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat   Day AR (%) t-stat 
-30 1.40 2.33   1 1.28 2.12 
-29 -0.52 -0.86   2 0.68 1.13 
-28 0.72 1.20   3 -0.62 -1.04 
-27 -0.26 -0.44   4 -0.63 -1.05 
-26 0.02 0.03   5 -0.69 -1.15 
-25 -0.49 -0.82   6 0.86 1.43 
-24 -0.61 -1.02   7 0.45 0.76 
-23 0.19 0.32   8 -0.50 -0.84 
-22 0.39 0.65   9 -0.20 -0.33 
-21 0.81 1.35   10 0.23 0.39 
-20 -1.03 -1.71   11 -0.42 -0.70 
-19 -0.40 -0.67   12 -0.21 -0.35 
-18 0.15 0.25   13 -0.11 -0.18 
-17 0.12 0.20   14 -0.27 -0.45 
-16 -0.98 -1.63   15 0.88 1.46 
-15 0.43 0.71   16 -0.01 -0.02 
-14 -0.40 -0.66   17 0.14 0.24 
-13 0.38 0.63   18 -0.77 -1.28 
-12 -0.90 -1.50   19 -0.27 -0.46 
-11 1.02 1.69   20 -0.08 -0.14 
-10 0.00 0.00   21 0.86 1.44 
-9 0.13 0.21   22 0.16 0.27 
-8 -0.55 -0.91   23 -0.27 -0.45 
-7 -0.59 -0.98   24 0.12 0.19 
-6 -0.42 -0.69   25 0.12 0.20 
-5 0.17 0.29   26 0.37 0.62 
-4 -0.45 -0.74   27 -0.02 -0.04 
-3 0.41 0.68   28 -1.31 -2.17 
-2 -0.40 -0.67   29 -0.32 -0.53 
-1 0.13 0.22   30 -0.01 -0.02 
0 1.09 1.82         
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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Table 12: Average ARs in control-changing and completed mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Control-Changing and Completed 
42 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat   Day AR (%) t-stat 
-30 0.02 0.04   1 2.53 4.45 * 
-29 -0.59 -1.03   2 0.23 0.41 
-28 0.90 1.58   3 0.06 0.10 
-27 -0.38 -0.66   4 -1.18 -2.08 
-26 0.35 0.61   5 0.15 0.26 
-25 -0.70 -1.23   6 -0.88 -1.55 
-24 0.41 0.72   7 -0.67 -1.18 
-23 0.36 0.64   8 -0.04 -0.08 
-22 0.15 0.26   9 0.10 0.17 
-21 0.31 0.54   10 0.14 0.25 
-20 -0.31 -0.54   11 0.15 0.27 
-19 -1.16 -2.04   12 -0.33 -0.58 
-18 0.80 1.40   13 -0.94 -1.66 
-17 -0.36 -0.63   14 -1.09 -1.92 
-16 0.43 0.76   15 0.19 0.33 
-15 0.46 0.81   16 -0.03 -0.06 
-14 0.62 1.08   17 0.33 0.58 
-13 0.30 0.53   18 -0.70 -1.22 
-12 0.53 0.93   19 -0.21 -0.37 
-11 0.62 1.09   20 -0.37 -0.65 
-10 -0.41 -0.72   21 -1.07 -1.88 
-9 -0.37 -0.66   22 -0.36 -0.63 
-8 -0.41 -0.72   23 -0.15 -0.26 
-7 0.11 0.19   24 0.12 0.20 
-6 0.83 1.45   25 0.02 0.03 
-5 0.58 1.01   26 -0.47 -0.83 
-4 0.36 0.64   27 -0.74 -1.29 
-3 0.33 0.59   28 -0.45 -0.80 
-2 1.41 2.49   29 1.57 2.76 * 
-1 3.31 5.82 *   30 -0.53 -0.93 
0 3.09 5.43 *         
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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5.2 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Daily ARs are useful to gain insight on stock-market reactions to mergers. CAR in a 
multi-day event window may prove useful for analyzing the aggregate impact of 
mergers. I analyze CARs in the three-day, seven-day, and 11-day event windows. 
Three-day event window is the most commonly used window in the literature 
(Andrade et al., 2001). I examine seven-day and 11-day windows for robustness. 
Equation 4 computes CARs. Equation 8 constructs the test statistics. 
 
5.2.1 Average CARs in Full Sample 
Average CARs to target firms is 4.88% in the three-day event window. In the seven-
day event window, CAR rises to 5.94% and to 5.63% in the 11-day window. Average 
CARs are significant at 1% level in all event windows. Table 13 presents the results 
in the full sample. 
Table 13: Average CARs in all mergers 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Full Sample 
125 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 4.88 7.67 * 
[-3, +3] 5.94 6.12 * 
[-5, +5] 5.63 4.63 * 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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5.2.2 Average CARs in Control-Changing versus Non-Control-Changing Mergers 
The empirical analysis compares CARs in control-changing mergers to CARs in non-
control-changing mergers. Control-changing mergers may result in higher stock-
market reaction than non-control-changing ones due to the value of control rights.  
Turkish target firms earn a significant 8.56% average CAR in the three-day event 
window. Furthermore, average CAR increases to 10.17% in the seven-day event 
window and 9.82% in the 11-day event window. These CARs are also significant at 
1%. Table 14 summarizes the results for control-changing mergers.  
Stock market puts a lower value on non-control-changing mergers. Average target 
CAR is 2.25% in the three-day event window and significant at 1% level. In the 
seven-day and 11-day event windows, CAR loses its significance. Table 15 presents 
average CARs and t-statistics for non-control-changing mergers. 
Table 14: Average CARs in control-changing mergers 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Control-Changing 
52 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 8.56 9.74 * 
[-3, +3] 10.17 7.57 * 
[-5, +5] 9.82 5.83 * 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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Table 15: Average CARs in non-control-changing mergers 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Non-Control-Changing 
73 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 2.25 2.71 * 
[-3, +3] 2.93 2.31 
[-5, +5] 2.65 1.67 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
 
5.2.3 Average CARs in Completed versus Incomplete Mergers 
In comparison of CARs in completed mergers to CARs in incomplete mergers, I find 
that completed mergers create a positive stock-market reaction on target shares while 
incomplete mergers have no significant effect. 
In the three-day event window, average CAR is 6.08%. This return is significant at 
the 1% level. On the other hand, I record an insignificant 2.5% average CAR in 
incomplete mergers subsample. Average CAR increases to 7.65% and 8% in the 
seven-day and 11-day event windows, respectively, in the completed mergers 
subsample. In contrast, I find no significant CARs in incomplete mergers subsample 
in the seven-day and 11-day event windows. Tables 16 and 17 provide the results for 
completed mergers and incomplete mergers, respectively.  
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Table 16: Average CARs in completed mergers 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Completed 
83 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 6.08 8.11 * 
[-3, +3] 7.65 6.68 * 
[-5, +5] 8.00 5.57 * 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
 
Table 17: Average CARs in incomplete mergers 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Incomplete 
42 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 2.50 2.40 
[-3, +3] 2.56 1.61 
[-5, +5] 0.97 0.49 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
 
 
42 
5.2.4 Average CARs in Control-Changing and Completed Mergers 
Highest average CARs are detected in the control-changing and completed mergers 
subsample. Targets on average realize CARs of 8.93% in the three-day event 
window. CARs increase to 10.96% in the seven-day event window and stays at 
10.87% in the 11-day window. CARs are significant at 1% in all event windows. 
Table 18 shows the results4
Table 18: Average CARs in control-changing and completed mergers 
. 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Control-Changing and Completed 
42 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 8.93 9.07 * 
[-3, +3] 10.96 7.29 * 
[-5, +5] 10.87 5.77 * 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
 
5.3 Merger Characteristics That Affect Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This study examines the impact of terms, such as cross-border mergers, intra-industry 
mergers and transaction values, on three-day CAR. To investigate the effect of 
merger terms on three-day CAR, I conduct a regression analysis. I use CARs in the 
three-day event window as the dependent variable. Independent variables are the 
                                                          
4 Appendix D presents the CARs and t-statistics in the remaining three subsamples. 
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merger characteristics. These characteristics are cross-border merger, intra-industry 
merger and transaction value. I show in the previous sections that control-change and 
merger status affect CAR. Hence, I include these variables as independent variables. I 
represent these characteristics using three dummy variables except for the transaction 
value. The first dummy variable takes a value of one if the merger is control-
changing. The second and third dummies take one if the merger is completed and 
intra-industry, respectively. Logarithms of adjusted transaction values are taken for 
the last independent variable. I apply this regression analysis to a dataset in which all 
of the characteristics are applicable which results in a sample of 85 deals. Table 19 
provides the results of the regression. 
Table 19: Regression results of merger characteristics 
This table reports regression results of merger characteristics such as: (i) control-
changing mergers; (ii) completed mergers; (iii) cross-border merges; (iv) intra-
industry mergers; (v) transaction values. The dependent variable is CAR in three-day 
event window. All characteristics except for transaction values, which are 
independent variables, are represented by dummy variables. Logarithms of 
transaction values are used as independent variable. 
Dependent Variable Specifications 
[-1, +1] CAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Control-Changing Merger 7.56     8.94 
 (3.96) *     (4.30) * Completed Merger  1.76    -0.61 
  (0.63)    (-0.22) Cross-Border Merger   -0.78   -1.28 
   (-0.38)   (-0.64) Intra-Industry Merger    -0.34  -0.75 
    (-0.16)  (-0.38) LOG (Real Transaction Val.)     -0.16 -0.71 
     (-0.36) (-1.64) 
Adjusted R 15% 2 -1% -1% -1% -1% 15% 
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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Control-change is a significant characteristic affecting that CAR (Specification 1). A 
merger causes 7.56% more average CAR in the three-day event window if target-
control changes hand. The remaining characteristics prove insignificant. Control-
change characteristic preserves its significance and the others remain as insignificant 
in the multiple regression (see Specification 6). 
Final status of mergers proves an insignificant characteristic according to the 
regression results. However, in completed mergers, target shareholders realize higher 
CAR than in incomplete mergers as seen in Tables 16 and 17. There is a contradiction 
between these two deductions. Thus, I run another regression. I use all of 125 deals 
instead of 85 deals since I already know the final status of each deal. As a result, 
completed mergers result in 3.58% more CAR than incomplete mergers. The result is 
significant at 10% level (see Table 20). 
Table 20: Regression results of completed mergers 
This table reports regression results of completed merger variable over the entire 
sample. 
Dependent Variable Specification 
[-1, +1] CAR  
Completed Merger 3.58 
 (1.84) 
Adjusted R 2% 2 
N 125 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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Finally, I investigate the impact of large merger deals. Instead of taking logarithm of 
transaction values, I use a dummy variable to classify large mergers. I use three 
threshold values which are 100 million TL, 500 million TL, and 1 billion TL. 
According to regressions for each threshold, results are insignificant without any 
explanatory power again (Table 21). Therefore, large mergers have no impact on 
CARs during the sample period. 
Table 21: Regression results of large deals 
All independent variables are dummies. Dummy variable takes a value of one if the 
transaction value is greater than the threshold value. 
Dependent Variable Specifications 
[-1, +1] CAR 1 2 3 
> 1 billion TL 0.13   
 (0.04)   
> 500 million TL  -0.32  
  (-0.13)  
> 100 million TL   0.01 
   (0.01) 
Adjusted R -1% 2 -1% -1% 
N 85 85 85 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
 
5.4 Summary of Empirical Results 
I find that Turkish targets earn 4.88% average CAR in the three-day event window. 
This average CAR increases to 8.56% in control-changing mergers and decreases to 
2.25% in non-control-changing mergers. This significant difference indicates that 
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acquirers pay more for acquiring the control rights in targets. Completed mergers also 
dominate incomplete mergers in terms of CARs in the three-day event window. 
Targets earn 6.08% in completed mergers. However, average CAR in incomplete 
mergers is 2.5% which is not significant at 1%. Investors do not know whether a 
merger will be completed or not at the announcement date. However, the difference 
in stronger market reactions to completed mergers and incomplete mergers show that 
investors may anticipate the final status of mergers. Table 22 summarizes my 
findings on cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day event window. 
Table 22: Summary of CARs in the period [-1, +1] 
This table shows average CARs in the three-day event window for the entire sample 
and its subsamples. Number of deals in the entire sample and its subsample are 
denoted in parentheses. 
Full Sample (125) 
4.88% * 
Control-Changing (52) Non-Control-Changing (73) 
8.56% * 2.25% * 
Completed (42) Incomplete (10) Completed (41) Incomplete (32) 
8.93% * 7.05% * 3.16% * 1.08% 
Completed (83) 6.08% * 
 
Incomplete (42) 2.50% 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I investigate the stock-market reactions to mergers of non-financial Turkish target 
firms. I conduct an event study to measure the short-run impacts of merger 
announcements. The sample consists of 125 mergers between January 1986 and 
December 2009. 52 of 125 mergers are control-changing. 83 of 125 mergers are 
completed.  
I find that Turkish targets earn positive CAR in the three-day event window. More 
precisely, Turkish targets earn 8.56% average CAR in the three-day event window 
around mergers in which acquirer firms purchase control rights of target firms. This 
premium is smaller than US and European targets’ premiums. US and European 
target firms earn average premium of 16% (Andrade et al., 2001) and 12.47% 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2009), respectively, in the three-day event window 
around the announcement.  
There may be several reasons for this difference. Stock market’s reaction to merger 
announcements may differ from country to country. US targets gain more than 
European targets. In Europe, UK targets earn more than Continental European 
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targets. Another possible reason is that announcement date specification is 
problematic for Turkish firms. Therefore, the possibility of taking wrong 
announcement dates into account may lower CAR. 
I also examine whether completed mergers, cross-border mergers, intra-industry 
mergers, and transaction value affect CAR in the three-day event window. Completed 
mergers cause 3.58% more premium than incomplete mergers at a 10% significance 
level. The remaining characteristics provide insignificant results. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Factiva Search Criteria 
 
I search mergers in Factiva using the form below. I append 17 non-confounding 
mergers to the sample using Factiva deals after 2006. 
Search Form 
At least one of these words merger acquisition target bidder acquirer takeover 
This exact phrase Istanbul Stock Exchange 
Date from 01/01/1986 to 31/12/2009 
Subject Acquisitions/Mergers/Takeovers 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Merger Sample 
 
B.1 Control-Changing Mergers 
Target Name Acquirer Name Date Announced 
Merger 
Status 
Nominal 
Transaction 
Val (TL) 
Real 
Transaction 
Val (2009 TL) 
AFM Uluslararasi Film A1 Group Ltd 20.06.2007 Completed 33,698,400 39,197,693 
Afyon Cimento Seeking Buyer 13.03.2000 S Buyer   
Akcimento Ticaret AS Cimenteries CBR 04.04.1996 Completed   
Anadolu Cam Sanayii AS Turkiye Sise Cam Fabrikalari 20.08.2003 Completed 65,786,516 114,576,527 
Bolu Cimento Sanayii AS Seeking Buyer 13.03.2000 S Buyer   
Bossa Ticaret ve Sanayi Akkardan Sanayi ve Ticaret AS 31.07.2008 Completed 88,134,892 96,732,556 
Bugun Yayincilik AS Sabah Yayincilik AS 07.07.1998 Completed 588,662 7,692,317 
Canakkale Cimento 
Sanayii AS 
Mortelmaatschappij 
Eindhoven 17.11.1995 Completed 14,660,000 968,818,511 
Celik Halat Ve Tel Sanayi 
ve 
Dogan Sirketler Grubu 
Hldg AS 08.08.1997 Completed 3,508,000 82,002,464 
Cimentas Izmir Cimento Cementir SpACementir SpA 11.06.2001 Completed 154,000,000 509,376,833 
Dogusan Boru Sanayii ve Seeking Buyer 16.07.2007 S Buyer   
Doktas Docum Sanayi ve 
Ticaret Componenta Oyj 18.10.2006 Completed 163,969,200 208,857,781 
Eczacıbaşı İlaç Zentiva N.V. 05.03.2007 Completed 878,922,000 1,101,189,929 
EFES Sinai Yatirim 
Holdings AS 
Coca Cola Icecek 
Uretim AS 21.10.2005 Completed 196,045,010 283,202,188 
Ege Profil Deceuninck NV 10.04.2001 Completed 5,220,000 20,015,535 
Eregli Demir Celik 
Fabrikalari Seeking Buyer 12.08.1993 S Buyer   
Gima Carrefour SA 03.05.2005 Completed 165,000,000 243,914,030 
Hektas Ticaret AS Tam Sigorta AS 14.10.1993 Completed   
Izmir Demir Celik Sanayi 
AS 
Sahin-Koc Celik 
Sanayi 23.09.2005 Completed 106,374,000 155,232,863 
Izocam Ticaret ve Sanayi 
AS JV-Isover,Alghanim 06.09.2006 Completed 250,004,869 330,864,979 
Kav Danismanlik 
Pazarlama ve Koc Holding AS 10.04.2008 Completed 5,060,775 5,756,418 
Kent Gıda Cadbury Schweppes PLC 17.01.2002 Completed 131,417,000 314,837,085 
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Kipa Kitle Pazarlama Tic Tesco PLC 27.02.2003 Completed 185,998,000 352,298,400 
Klimasan Klima Sanayi ve Metalfrio Solutions SA 03.10.2007 Completed 55,711,428 61,273,891 
Konya Cimento Sanayii 
AS Vicat SA 02.07.1991 Completed   
Lafarge Aslan Cimento OYAK 26.12.2008 Completed 271,818,540 286,494,321 
Marshall Boya Ve Vernik Akzo Nobel NV 19.03.1998 Completed 17,000,000 257,105,512 
Meges Boya Sanayi Ve 
Ticaret 
SKW Bauchemie 
Holding GmbH 17.06.1998 Completed 1,413,000 18,907,464 
Migros Turk Ticaret AS Migros Turk Ticaret AS SPV 21.05.2007 Completed 1,977,365,405 2,300,054,643 
Milliyet Gazetecilik Korkmaz Yigit 07.10.1998 Completed 51,400,000 585,377,454 
Netas Telekomunikasyon Rhea Girisim Sermayesi 30.07.2009 Pending   
Petkim Petrokimya 
Holding AS Investor Group 08.02.2007 Completed 2,652,085,000 3,337,050,642 
Petrol Ofisi AS Investor Group 08.12.1997 Withdrawn 290,000,000 5,152,015,690 
Petrol Ofisi AS Investor Group 28.01.2000 Completed 630,000,000 3,720,262,025 
Tansas Izmir Buyuksehir Dogus Grubu Binalari 07.01.1999 Completed 21,333,000 212,570,564 
Tansas Izmir Buyuksehir Migros Turk Ticaret AS 15.08.2005 Completed 579,012,000 852,141,357 
Tire Kutsan Oluklu 
Mukavva Bomsas Mukavva 01.04.2002 Completed   
Tire Kutsan Oluklu 
Mukavva 
Mondi Packaging 
Paper Swiece 20.04.2007 Completed 142,154,501 175,163,845 
Tofas Oto Ticaret Tofas Turk Otomobil Fabrikasi 14.06.2000 Completed 45,450,000 229,335,200 
Transturk Fren Donanim AlliedSignal Intl Finance 19.09.1995 Completed 804,762 61,918,216 
Turcas Petrolculuk Turkpetrol International Inc 16.02.1996 Completed 4,295,600 239,840,695 
Turk Demir Dokum Vaillant Saunier Duval Iberica 12.06.2006 Completed 376,450,295 461,762,724 
Turk Hava Yollari AO Seeking Buyer 01.08.1996 S Buyer W   
Turk Hava Yollari AO Seeking Buyer 13.12.2000 S Buyer   
Turk Siemens Pirelli & Co SpA 03.08.1998 Completed 5,661,000 71,542,446 
Turk Tuborg Bira Ve Malt Carlsberg Breweries A/S 31.05.2001 Completed 65,000,000 225,961,548 
Turk Tuborg Bira Ve Malt Central Bottling Co Ltd 27.03.2008 Completed 95,704,000 105,869,994 
Turkcell Iletisim 
Hizmetleri TeliaSonera AB 25.03.2005 Completed 4,210,000,000 6,283,986,305 
Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri 
AS Investors 12.08.1993 Intended   
Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri 
AS Investor Group 03.04.2003 Withdrawn 2,180,544,600 3,915,207,942 
Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri 
AS Investor Group 13.09.2005 Completed 5,556,000,000 8,107,937,898 
Viking Kagit ve Seluloz 
AS Investor Group 28.07.2000 Completed 14,750,000 73,909,350 
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B.2 Non-Control-Changing Mergers 
Target Name Acquirer Name Date Announced 
Merger 
Status 
Nominal 
Transaction 
Val (TL) 
Real 
Transaction 
Val (2009 TL) 
Abana Elektromekanik 
Sanayii Ar Holdings AS 23.02.1995 Completed 12,393 1,256,335 
Ak-Al Tekstil Aksu Iplik 19.03.2007 Completed   
Akenerji Elektrik Uretim CEZ 01.11.2007 Completed 427,694,840 469,416,983 
Alcatel Teletas 
Telekomunikasy Investors 07.06.1995 
Status 
Unknown   
Alcatel Teletas 
Telekomunikasy Seeking Buyer 21.08.2001 S Buyer   
Anadolu Biracilik ve Malt Efes Pilsen Group 11.05.1998 Completed 12,100,000 62,398,349 
Bagfas Recep Gencer 26.02.2003 Completed 2,775,600 5,257,258 
Baticim Anadola Cimento Orascom Constr Ind SAE 26.01.2006 Completed 72,500,000 101,045,164 
Bayrakli Boya ve Vernik Yasar Holding AS 12.07.2001 Completed 5,571,263 17,873,659 
Bolu Cimento Sanayii AS Dogus SA(Dogus Holding AS) 02.08.1995 
Status 
Unknown 236,980 18,940,872 
Bolu Cimento Sanayii AS Dogus Grubu Binalari 29.06.2001 Completed 7,485,662 24,759,888 
Boyner Buyuk 
Magazacilik AS CVCI 13.02.2007 Pending 67,478,000 84,905,839 
BSH Profilo SA BSH Bosch und Siemens 26.09.1995 Completed 4,600,000 353,923,016 
BSH Profilo SA BSH Bosch und Siemens 14.07.2003 Completed 105,566,500 183,123,563 
Carsi Buyuk Magazacilik Altinyildiz Holdings AS 08.01.2002 Pending 20,623,880 51,961,042 
CBS Printas Oto Boya ve Michael Huber Munchen GmbH 30.07.1998 Withdrawn 450,000 5,879,298 
Ceytas Madencilik Tekstil Investor 04.06.2001 Completed 23,035 76,192 
Ceytas Madencilik Tekstil Park Elektrik Madencilik 26.12.2008 Completed   
Cukurova Elektrik TAS Rumeli Elektrik Yatirim AS 11.02.1993 Completed 2,796,000 1,109,177,979 
Deva Holding AS Nutricia International BV 09.05.1995 
Status 
Unknown   
Dogan Gazetecilik AS Deutsche Bank AG 28.03.2007 Completed 113,300,000 132,840,758 
Dogan Yayin Holding Axel Springer AG 27.11.2008 Status Unknown 198,000,000 211,808,126 
Ege Biracilik ve Malt 
Sanayii Efes Pilsen Group 11.05.1998 Completed 146,700,000 756,515,517 
Ege Profil Deceuninck NV 12.01.2000 Completed 5,282,000 31,191,149 
Egeplast Ege Yildiz Plastik Pazarlama 07.01.2002 Completed   
Erciyas Biracilik ve Malt Efes Pilsen Group 11.05.1998 Completed 103,700,000 534,769,319 
Eregli Demir Celik 
Fabrikalari Ataer Holding AS 04.10.2005 Completed 4,000,000,000 5,778,309,550 
Eregli Demir Celik 
Fabrikalari Arcelor Mittal NV 13.06.2008 Completed 1,091,000,000 1,202,544,814 
Escort Computer 
Elektronik Seeking Buyer 28.06.2001 S Buyer   
Grundig Elektronik AS Arcelik AS 05.12.2008 Completed 130,000,000 137,921,195 
Guney Biracilik ve Malt Efes Pilsen Group 11.05.1998 Completed 29,000,000 149,549,761 
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Hurriyet Gazetecilik ve Iktisat Bank 21.06.1993 Completed 112,320 37,415,011 
Hurriyet Gazetecilik ve Investor Group 02.01.1998 Completed   
Ihlas Ev Seeking Buyer 26.07.2002 S Buyer   
Isiklar Ambalaj Commercial Bank of Greece SA 28.03.2000 Completed 5,852,976 31,772,799 
Kartonsan Karton Sanayi 
Ve Park Holding 06.07.2001 Pending 132,845 426,114 
Kent Gıda Cadbury Schweppes PLC 13.12.2005 Completed 127,354,320 175,315,671 
Kent Gıda Cadbury Schweppes PLC 15.05.2009 Completed 26,580,226 28,015,321 
Kerevitas Gida Sanayi ve Schoeller Holding Gmbh & CO KG 08.12.1997 Pending 8,896 158,043 
Kerevitas Gida Sanayi ve Nestle SA 22.10.2001 Completed   
Konya Cimento Sanayii 
AS Seeking Buyer 01.11.1996 S Buyer   
Marmaris Altinyunus Koc Holding AS 19.10.2001 Pending   
Metas Rumeli Celik Sanayi AS 06.02.1995 
Status 
Unknown 2,410,000 244,268,753 
Otosan Otomobil Sanayii 
AS Ford Motor Co 01.11.1996 Pending   
Oysa Cimento Sanayii AS Haci Omer Sabanci Holding AS 22.03.2007 Pending   
Penguen Gida Sanayi AS DEG 16.08.2001 Completed 13,347,530 41,817,759 
Petkim Petrokimya 
Holding AS Investors 12.08.1993 
Status 
Unknown   
Petrol Ofisi AS Investors 09.03.1995 Status Unknown   
Petrol Ofisi AS Undisclosed Acquiror 18.03.2002 Completed 247,500,000 582,454,170 
Petrol Ofisi AS Dogan Sirketler Grubu Hldg AS 12.09.2005 Completed 87,940,138 128,332,105 
Petrol Ofisi AS OMV AG 17.10.2007 Completed 71,195,967 86,833,818 
Pinar Entegre ET VE Yem Investors 24.04.1995 Status Unknown   
Sabah Yayincilik AS Investor Group 20.10.2000 Completed 20,377,500 94,819,532 
Simko Ticaret ve 
Sanayi(Sieme) Siemens AG 14.04.1995 
Status 
Unknown 1,074,048 98,934,775 
Tansas Izmir Buyuksehir Dogus Otomotiv AS 29.06.2001 Completed 11,341,182 37,512,567 
Tat Konserve Sanayii A.S. Templeton Asset Management 17.05.2007 
Status 
Unknown 23,580,000 28,923,779 
TAV Havalimanlari 
Holding AS 
Meinl Airports 
International Limited 12.11.2007 
Status 
Unknown 369,117,000 442,188,162 
Tire Kutsan Oluklu 
Mukavva Investor Group 01.12.1997 Completed   
Tofas Turk Otomobil 
Fabrikasi Investors 18.08.1993 Completed 7,920,000 2,470,276,363 
Tofas Turk Otomobil 
Fabrikasi Koc Holding AS 20.01.1995 Completed   
Trakya Cam Sanayii AS Turkiye Is Bankasi AS 18.12.1998 Pending 2,100 21,608 
Turcas Petrolculuk Burmah Castrol PLC 30.11.1994 Completed 556,300 69,214,009 
Turcas Petrolculuk Tabas Petrolculuk AS 10.06.1999 Pending   
Turcas Petrolculuk Aksoy Petrol Dagitim 10.06.2005 Completed 34,025,000 49,839,506 
Turk Hava Yollari AO Investors 09.05.1994 Status Unknown   
Turk Hava Yollari AO Seeking Buyer 11.08.2003 S Buyer   
Turk Tuborg Bira Ve Malt Carlsberg A/S 06.02.2003 Completed   
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Turkcell Iletisim 
Hizmetleri Seeking Buyer 12.12.2002 S Buyer   
Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri 
AS Investors 21.01.2000 Completed 729,953,000 4,310,502,264 
Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri 
AS Investors 05.10.2001 Pending   
USAS Seeking Buyer 06.10.2003 S Buyer   
Van Et Ticari Yatirimlar 
Gida Seeking Buyer 23.01.2002 S Buyer   
Zorlu Enerji Elektrik 
Uretimi 
Merrill Lynch & Co 
Inc 22.01.2001 Pending   
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APPENDIX C 
 
Average Abnormal Returns 
 
C.1 ARs in Control-Changing and Incomplete Mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Control-Changing and Incomplete 
10 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat   Day AR (%) t-stat 
-30 1.12 0.97   1 4.06 3.51 * 
-29 0.43 0.37   2 0.38 0.33 
-28 1.04 0.90   3 -1.18 -1.02 
-27 -0.52 -0.45   4 -2.62 -2.27 
-26 -0.21 -0.18   5 1.07 0.93 
-25 -1.16 -1.01   6 1.78 1.54 
-24 1.07 0.93   7 3.03 2.63 * 
-23 1.15 0.99   8 -1.52 -1.32 
-22 1.27 1.10   9 -0.78 -0.68 
-21 0.41 0.36   10 1.58 1.37 
-20 -1.92 -1.66   11 1.13 0.98 
-19 -0.60 -0.52   12 -0.26 -0.23 
-18 -0.18 -0.15   13 0.50 0.43 
-17 -1.48 -1.28   14 2.13 1.84 
-16 -2.41 -2.09   15 0.12 0.10 
-15 2.64 2.28   16 0.31 0.27 
-14 0.02 0.02   17 -0.31 -0.27 
-13 -0.37 -0.32   18 0.73 0.63 
-12 -0.13 -0.11   19 0.55 0.47 
-11 0.80 0.70   20 -0.53 -0.46 
-10 0.11 0.10   21 1.24 1.07 
-9 -0.07 -0.06   22 1.55 1.34 
-8 0.48 0.42   23 1.71 1.48 
-7 0.40 0.34   24 -0.65 -0.57 
-6 0.35 0.30   25 -0.03 -0.02 
-5 1.38 1.20   26 0.15 0.13 
-4 -1.24 -1.08   27 -0.16 -0.14 
-3 1.12 0.97   28 -0.59 -0.51 
-2 -0.52 -0.45   29 0.48 0.41 
-1 1.02 0.89   30 0.60 0.52 
0 1.97 1.71         
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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C.2 ARs in Non-Control-Changing and Completed Mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Non-Control-Changing and Completed 
41 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat   Day AR (%) t-stat 
-30 0.68 1.09   1 1.03 1.65 
-29 0.58 0.94   2 1.55 2.48 
-28 -0.70 -1.13   3 -0.75 -1.20 
-27 0.34 0.54   4 -0.80 -1.28 
-26 -1.23 -1.97   5 -0.68 -1.09 
-25 -1.03 -1.64   6 -0.85 -1.36 
-24 -0.42 -0.68   7 0.19 0.31 
-23 -0.24 -0.39   8 0.44 0.71 
-22 0.15 0.23   9 -0.61 -0.98 
-21 -0.54 -0.87   10 1.31 2.11 
-20 0.04 0.06   11 -0.19 -0.31 
-19 0.06 0.10   12 -0.83 -1.34 
-18 0.21 0.34   13 -0.59 -0.95 
-17 0.86 1.38   14 0.60 0.97 
-16 0.85 1.36   15 0.90 1.44 
-15 0.04 0.06   16 -0.36 -0.58 
-14 0.04 0.06   17 0.83 1.33 
-13 0.21 0.34   18 -0.63 -1.01 
-12 0.76 1.22   19 -0.13 -0.21 
-11 -0.56 -0.91   20 -0.89 -1.43 
-10 -0.65 -1.05   21 -0.67 -1.07 
-9 0.27 0.43   22 0.25 0.40 
-8 -1.11 -1.77   23 -0.29 -0.46 
-7 -0.26 -0.42   24 -1.27 -2.04 
-6 0.21 0.34   25 0.04 0.06 
-5 1.26 2.02   26 0.16 0.26 
-4 1.01 1.62   27 -1.17 -1.87 
-3 0.05 0.07   28 -0.33 -0.53 
-2 0.25 0.40   29 0.57 0.92 
-1 0.20 0.32   30 0.32 0.51 
0 1.93 3.10 *         
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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C.3 ARs in Non-Control-Changing and Incomplete Mergers 
This table shows average ARs to target firms in the 61-day event window. Abnormal 
returns are the difference between realized returns and expected returns. I use OLS 
market model to compute expected returns. The test statistic is the ratio of average 
abnormal return on a day to its estimated standard deviation. 
Non-Control-Changing and Incomplete 
32 Mergers 
Day AR (%) t-stat   Day AR (%) t-stat 
-30 1.49 2.09   1 0.41 0.57 
-29 -0.81 -1.15   2 0.77 1.08 
-28 0.62 0.87   3 -0.45 -0.63 
-27 -0.18 -0.25   4 -0.01 -0.01 
-26 0.09 0.12   5 -1.24 -1.75 
-25 -0.28 -0.40   6 0.57 0.80 
-24 -1.14 -1.60   7 -0.35 -0.49 
-23 -0.11 -0.15   8 -0.18 -0.26 
-22 0.11 0.16   9 -0.02 -0.02 
-21 0.94 1.32   10 -0.19 -0.26 
-20 -0.75 -1.05   11 -0.90 -1.27 
-19 -0.34 -0.47   12 -0.20 -0.28 
-18 0.25 0.35   13 -0.30 -0.42 
-17 0.62 0.87   14 -1.02 -1.44 
-16 -0.54 -0.75   15 1.12 1.57 
-15 -0.26 -0.37   16 -0.11 -0.15 
-14 -0.53 -0.74   17 0.28 0.40 
-13 0.61 0.86   18 -1.24 -1.74 
-12 -1.14 -1.60   19 -0.53 -0.75 
-11 1.08 1.52   20 0.06 0.08 
-10 -0.04 -0.05   21 0.75 1.05 
-9 0.19 0.27   22 -0.27 -0.38 
-8 -0.87 -1.22   23 -0.89 -1.25 
-7 -0.89 -1.26   24 0.35 0.50 
-6 -0.65 -0.92   25 0.17 0.24 
-5 -0.20 -0.28   26 0.44 0.63 
-4 -0.20 -0.28   27 0.02 0.03 
-3 0.19 0.27   28 -1.53 -2.15 
-2 -0.36 -0.51   29 -0.57 -0.80 
-1 -0.15 -0.20   30 -0.21 -0.29 
0 0.82 1.15         
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
D.1 CARs in Control-Changing and Incomplete Mergers 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Control-Changing and Incomplete 
10 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 7.05 3.53 * 
[-3, +3] 6.85 2.24 
[-5, +5] 5.44 1.42 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
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D.2 CARs in Non-Control-Changing and Completed Mergers 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Non-Control-Changing and Completed 
41 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 3.16 2.93 * 
[-3, +3] 4.26 2.58 * 
[-5, +5] 5.05 2.44 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
 
D.3 CARs in Non-Control-Changing and Incomplete Mergers 
This table shows average CARs to target firms in three different event windows. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of ARs over multi-day event 
windows. The test statistic is the ratio of average CAR in the multi-day period to its 
estimated standard deviation. 
Non-Control-Changing and Incomplete 
32 Mergers 
Period CAR (%) t-stat 
[-1, +1] 1.08 0.88 
[-3, +3] 1.22 0.65 
[-5, +5] -0.43 -0.18 
* denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
 
